SECOND DIVISION
MARISON C. BASUEL, G.R.
No. 143664
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO,
J., Chairperson,*
-
versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,**
AZCUNA,
and
GARCIA,
JJ.
FACT-FINDING AND
INTELLIGENCE BUREAU Promulgated:
(FFIB) represented by DIRECTOR
AGAPITO B. ROSALES,
Respondent.
x
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x
DECISION
AZCUNA,
J.:
Petitioner
Marison Basuel assails in
this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court the resolution[1]
dated
Petitioner, together with her husband,
Leomar B. Basuel, and Roy Recoter, all employees of the Philippine Veterans Affairs
Office (PVAO) assigned to the Management Information System Group,[3]
were charged administratively for neglect of duty and dishonesty in connection
with the unauthorized encoding and payment of pension checks. Based on the report[4]
of respondent Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau, Leomar
B. Basuel made unauthorized supplementary encoding of
31 checks in 1996 and 30 checks between January 1997 and January 1998 in the
total amount of P1,141,682.90. The
supplementary payment entries were not covered by any Memorandum of Payment or
legal authority from the Finance Management Division or any other PVAO officer.
On
the other hand, nine unauthorized payments in the total amount of P309,275
were found to have been entered between February 1997 and October 1997 in the Supplementary
Table of petitioner. Similarly, Roy Recoter was found
to have made four supplementary payments without proper authority between
September and November 1997 amounting to P87,000.
In the counter-affidavit she submitted, petitioner denied the charges against her and blamed Leomar B. Basuel who purportedly used her computer access code without her knowledge or consent to make the unauthorized entries in her Supplementary Table.
After due proceedings, the Ombudsman ruled that the administrative liability of petitioner, Leomar B. Basuel and Roy Recoter was established by substantial evidence. With respect to petitioner, the Ombudsman made the following observation:
x x x
As regards respondent MARISON BASUEL [petitioner
herein], although the records reveal that the nine (9) entries attributed to
her appear to be covered with the corresponding Memorandum, and are thus,
authorized, still she cannot escape liability for Neglect of Duty.
It has been established that respondent MARISON BASUEL
has been entrusted with a specific access code to enable her to use the PVAO
computer. It was also established that said respondent divulged the access code
to respondent LEOMAR BASUEL, enabling the latter to gain access to the
computers and make the unauthorized entries. It need not be stated that an
average person would have known that the computer access code has a specific
purpose, which is to avoid unauthorized persons from gaining access to the PVAO
computers. Respondent MARISON BASUEL is duty-bound to maintain the
confidentiality of her access code. In revealing the same to her husband, she
has shown such deficiency of perception or her failure to pay proper attention
and due diligence in foreseeing the damage it might cause, which, in essence,
amounts to Negligence. Notwithstanding her claim of good faith, respondent
MARISON BASUEL’s administrative liability for her
remiss [sic] of duty has been sufficiently established. x x
x [5]
Consequently, petitioner was found
guilty of neglect of duty and meted a penalty of suspension for six months
without pay. After petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the
Ombudsman, petitioner filed a petition for review[6]
with the CA. The CA, however, denied the petition for failure of petitioner to
comply with its resolution[7]
dated
Petitioner thereafter realized that
her counsel had inadvertently attached the order dated
Aggrieved,
petitioner filed this present petition, ascribing the following errors to the
CA:
1. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
REVIEW ON TECHNICAL GROUNDS.
2. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THERE ARE
PERSUASIVE REASONS TO RELAX THE RIGID APPLICATION OF THE RULES. x x x[11]
Petitioner argues that there are
persuasive reasons in this case which warrant a departure from the rigid
application of the rules, namely: (1) the inadvertent omission of counsel in
attaching the order of the Office of the Ombudsman dated November 19, 1999
instead of the decision dated October 18, 1999, despite its correct citation in
the petition for review, is not attributable to petitioner; (2) the appeal has
merit; and (3) respondent is not prejudiced by the appeal.
In its comment[12]
dated
The
petition should be denied.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal.[13]
The requirements of the rules on appeal cannot be considered as merely harmless and trivial technicalities that can be discarded at whim. To be sure, the Court will not countenance deviations from the rules. In these times when court dockets are clogged with numerous litigations, parties have to abide by these rules with greater fidelity in order to facilitate the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.[14]
In the present case, it is not disputed that petitioner failed
to attach to her petition a certified true copy of the decision she was
appealing from which is contrary to the requirements set forth in Section 6, Rule
43 of the Rules of Court.[15]
The consequence of this failure is outlined under Sections 7 and 8 of Rule 43, to
wit:
SEC. 7. Effect of failure to
comply with requirements. – The failure of the petitioner to comply with
any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other
lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the
contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.
SEC. 8. Action on the petition.
– The Court of Appeals may require the respondent to file a comment on the
petition, not a motion to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice, or dismiss
the petition if it finds the same to be patently without merit, prosecuted
manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too
unsubstantial to require consideration.[16]
It is worthy to note that instead of dismissing the
petition outright, the CA gave petitioner a chance to rectify her mistake by
directing her to file a copy of the decision in the resolution dated
It likewise does not escape the Court’s notice that petitioner
subsequently admits having committed the procedural infraction but asks for the relaxation of the
rules considering that the negligence of her counsel is not attributable to her.
The general rule is that the mistake and negligence of counsel are binding on the client.[17] This is based on the principle that any act performed by the lawyer within the scope of the express or implied authority is regarded as an act of the client.[18] Otherwise, there would be no end to a suit so long as a new counsel could be employed who would allege and show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced, or learned.[19]
Admittedly, there have been instances when this Court accorded relief to clients who suffered by reason of their lawyer’s gross or palpable mistake or negligence.[20] However, the instant case does not fall under any of the exceptions. The reasons advanced by petitioner are not compelling enough to exempt her from the application of the general rule. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the negligence of her counsel is not of such degree as to deprive her of her property without due process of law.
While the rigid application of the rules of procedure has, in the past, been relaxed so that the ends of justice may be better served, such liberality may not be invoked if it would result in the wanton disregard of the rules, and cause needless delay. Save for the most persuasive of reasons, strict compliance with the rules is enjoined to facilitate the orderly administration of justice.[21] Under the factual circumstances of this case, the negligence of petitioner’s counsel does not constitute sufficient justification for a liberal application of procedural rules in her favor. In addition, to grant petitioner’s request would be to fault the CA for acting in faithful compliance with the rules of procedure which that court has been mandated to observe.[22] Viewed in this light, it cannot be said that the CA committed an error in denying the petition for being procedurally defective.
Besides,
on the merits, petitioner primarily challenges the finding of the Ombudsman
that she disclosed her access code to Leomar B. Basuel, which is a factual issue. Factual issues are not cognizable by this
Court in a petition for review under Rule 45. In order to resolve this issue,
the Court would necessarily have to look into the probative value of the
evidence presented in the proceedings below. It is not the function of the Court
to reexamine or reevaluate the evidence all over again.[23] This
Court is not a trier of facts, its jurisdiction in these cases being limited to
reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts.[24]
In any event, a careful perusal of the
records shows that there is substantial evidence to support the Ombudsman’s finding
that petitioner is guilty of the offense charged against her. Incidentally, it should
be emphasized that findings made by an administrative body which has acquired
expertise are accorded not only respect but even finality by the Court.[25] In
administrative proceedings, the quantum of evidence required is only
substantial. The gauge of substantial evidence is satisfied where there is
reasonable ground to believe that the petitioner is guilty of misconduct, even
if the evidence might not be overwhelming.[26] Thus, absent a clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion, the findings of the Ombudsman, when supported by substantial
evidence, are conclusive[27]
and shall not be disturbed by the Court.[28]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Acting Chief Justice
Chairperson
(On Official Business)
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ RENATO C.
CORONA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Acting Chief Justice
* Acting Chief Justice.
** On Official Business.
[1] CA
Rollo, pp. 49-50.
[2] Records,
pp. 0153-0161.
[3] The
MISG is a unit of the PVAO primarily tasked to encode and print pension checks.
[4] Records,
pp. 0003-0009.
[5] Records,
pp. 44-45.
[6] CA
Rollo, pp. 2-15.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] Rollo, p. 17.
[12]
[13] Neypes v. CA, G.R. No. 141524,
[14] Baniqued v. Ramos, G.R. No. 158615,
[15]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 43,
Section 6. Contents of the petition- The petition for review
shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or
respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the facts and issues involved
and the grounds relied upon for the review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly
legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment,
final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of
such material portions of the record referred to therein and other supporting
papers; and (d) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as
provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42. The petition shall state
the specific material dates showing that it was filed within the period fixed
herein. (Emphasis supplied.)
[16] RULES
OF COURT.
[17] Macondray & Co., Inc. v. Provident Insurance
Corporation, G.R. No. 154305, December 9, 2004, 445 SCRA 644.
[18] Zarate v. Maybank Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 160976,
[19]
[20] R.
Transport Corporation v. Philippine Hawk Transport Corporation, G.R. No. 155737, October 19, 2005, 473
SCRA 342; APEX Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 482 (1999).
[21] Cruz
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156894,
[22] Casim v. Flordeliza,
G.R. No. 139511,
[23] Kwok
v. Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corp., G.R. No. 149252,
465.
[24] Basmayor v. Atencio, G.R.
No. 160573,
Trading Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 129189,
[25] Advincula v. Dicen, G.R. No. 162403,
[26] Civil
Service Commission v. Cayobit, G.R. No. 145737,
[27] Republic
Act No. 6770, Section 27.
[28] Espinoza
v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 135775,